INTRODUCTION
Under a "classical" corporate tax system such as that prevailing in the United States, income from equity-financed corporate investment is taxed twice: at the corporate level a tax is levied on corporate profits after deduction for interest payments, and at the shareholder level dividends and realized capital gains on shares are subject to full personal income tax.
Over the years, many economists have argued that this system of "double taxation" significantly reduces the overall investment level and drives capital from the corporate sector into lower yielding projects in the noncorporate sector. Influenced by this line of argument, many governments in the OECD area have introduced measures to alleviate the double taxation of corporate-source income, e.g., by granting a credit for the underlying corporate tax against the personal tax on dividends, and/or by offering favorable personal tax treatment of capital gains on shares.'
On the other hand, some economists have claimed that the traditional view *Economic Policy Research Unit, Copenhagen Busmess School, 1366 Copenhagen K, Denmark. greatly overstates the distortionary effects of a classical corporate tax system, implying that double tax relief may cause a considerable loss of government revenue without generating much stimulus to investment.
It is clearly important for public policy which view of the corporation tax is the more correct one. This article attempts to explain in a nontechnical manner the different viewpoints on the nature and impact of the corporate income tax. I will focus on the effects of double taxation of corporate-source income on the cost of corporate capital, defined as the minimum pretax rate of return a corporate investment project must earn to be profitable. To limit the scope of the paper, the emphasis will be on theoretical ideas, with no systematic review of empirical evidence. In the first two parts of the paper, I will abstract from the complications caused by international capital mobility, but the third part will address the special problems for corporate tax policy arising in the open economy.
TAXATION AND THE COST OF CORPORATE CAPITAL
In "Elaborated by numerous writers over the years, but heavily influenced by Harberger (1962 Harberger ( , 1946 . 'Reaching its most developed form in Stiglitz (1973) . dDeveloped and elaborated by King (1974a King ( . b. 1977 . Auerbach (1979) , Bradford (1980 Bradford ( , 1981 add Sinn (1985) . eDeveloped by Sinn (1991b). corporate income taxation.2 The staternents regarding the cost of capital assume that taxable profits are equal to the true economic profits, i.e., that depreciation for tax purposes corresponds to the true economic depreciation of the firm's assets.3 The following sections provide some explanatory remarks to the table.
The "Old" View of the Corporation Tax
According to the traditional view--also referred to as the "old" view-a classical corporate tax system will distort the financing as well as the real investment decisions Iof corporation 7 . Since interest payments are deductible1 from the corporate income tax base, hdnce escaping double taxation, there is a tendency for debt finance to be subsjituted for equity finance. Moreover, since, the shareholder's personal tax on capital gains is deferred until the time of r ealization, whereas his dividend income is taxed immediately, corporatiotjs are induced to generate capital gains tq shareholders by retaining part of their p ofits 1 rather than paying them out as divi ends. To some extent, the substitution c>f debt finance for equity finance and tde replacement 280 I SYMPOSIUM ON THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX of new equity by retained profits will reduce the impact of taxation on the cost of corporate capital. However, according to the old view, corporations will still wish to rely on some amount of equity finance at the margin, including some amount of new equity. The double taxation of corporate equity income will therefore reduce the overall level of saving and investment and drive the required pretax rate of return on corporate investment above the pretax rate of return required in the noncorporate sector. As a result, too little capital is allocated to the corporate sector, and too much is allocated to the noncorporate sector, as seen from society's viewpoint.
To explain why corporations would want to use some amount of equity finance at the margin despite the tax-preferred status of debt finance, the holders of the old view typically argue that high debtequity ratios generate certain invisible costs stemming from the risks of financial distress and bankruptcy. At some leverage ratio well below a hundred percent the rise in these costs will outweigh the tax benefits of increased reliance on debt finance.
The old view also assumes that shareholders have a nontax preference for dividends over capital gains on shares. Other things equal, shareholders will thus require a lower after-tax return on shares in corporations with higher dividend pay-out ratios. Up to a point, the corporation is therefore able to reduce its cost of equity finance by raising its pay-out ratio. Since new share issues increase the ability of the corporation to pay dividends to existing shareholders, it becomes optimal for the valuemaximizing corporation to rely to some extent on new equity rather than using only retained profits as the source of equity finance. In principle, the corporation will raise its dividend pay-out ratio to the point where the marginal nontax benefits from increased dividend payments are just offset by the tax penalty on dividends, with the tax penalty being equal to the difference between the personal tax rate on dividends and the effective personal tax rate on (accrued) capital gains on shares.
Proponents of the old view do not always make very clear wt~y shareholders would require lower net returns on shares with higher dividend pay-out ratios. The most popular hypothesis is that dividends serve as a signal to the stock market that the corporation is financially healthy and faces bright earnings prospects. Critics have found this theory rather unconvincing, arguing that a corporation faced with profitable investment opportunities should retain and reinvest its profits rather than paying them out.
The critics of the old view tend to downgrade the importance of nontax factors for corporate financing decisions. The point of departure for these sceptics is the so-called Modigliani-Miller theorem, according to which shareholders would be indifferent to the corporation's financial policy in a world without taxes, since investors would always be able to neutralize the effects of the firm's borrowing and dividend policy on the riskreturn profiles of their personal portfolios by selling from or borrowing against their portfolios. If the various modes of finance are in fact equally attractive from a nontax point of view, it follows that the corporation should rely exclusively on the source of finance that is most favored by the tax system.
In most countries, this mode of finance would be debt, because equity-financed investment tends to be subject to double taxation. If debt is used as the marginal source of finance, and taxable profits coincide with actual profits, it will be profitable for the c:orporation to carry its real investment to the point where the risk-adjusted marginal pretax rate of return is just equal to the (deductible) market rate of interest before tax. In other words, the optimal investment policy of the corporation would be identical to the optimal policy in a hypothetical world of zero taxes, and the corporation tax would be neutral, falling only on the inframarginal profits exceeding the market interest rate. Stiglitz (1973) argued that the corporate income tax will also be neutral if the total corporate and personal tax burden on retained earnings is lower than the personal tax on interest income so that finance by retentions is tax-preferred to (debt finance. In this situation---which 'Stiglitz believed to prevail in the U.S. be-.fore the 1981 tax reform-the corporation should undertake retentionsfinanced real investment until the marginal rate of return becomes equal to the market interest rate, and the relmaining profits (if any) should be used .for financial investrnent in the capital market. In the absence of nontax benefits from dividend payments, it is not rational to pay out any dividends if distributions are penalized by the tax system, and if financial investment undertaken through the corporation is taxed more lightly than financial investment undertaken directly by the shareholders themselves.4 Furthermore, it would obviously not be rational for the corporation to carry out real investment with a return below the market interest rate when it could alternatively invest in financial assets. It should be clear that such a tax regime is really equivalent to a regime of debt finance: to increase its real investment by one dollar,, the Icorporation will have to reduce its financial investment by one dollar, so the opportunity cost of real investment is the interest rate that might have been earned in the capital market. In short, the c&t of corporate capital equals the goin 9 interest rate, and again the corporation tax falls only on the inframarginal investments with returns above the markht rate of interest.
The "'New" View The neutrality hypothesis does not square with the observations that most corporations do tend t9 pay dividends on a regular basis and that they rarely rely exclusively on debt ~finance at the margin. The so-called "hew" view of the corporation tax assume s that corporations pay dividends and accepts the fact that firms will typically wish to use some amount of equity finanqe at the margin. However, according to the new view there is no convincing rpason why shareholders should prefer a dollar of net divldend to a dollar of net capital gain on shares. instead, it is argped that a mature corporation earnind sufficient profits should mleet all of its nqed for equity finance through retentiois and should pay out only the remaiding profit as dividends. A mature corporbtion operating under a classical corpor+e tax system should never substitute ew share issues n for retained earnings, si@ce this would transform lightly taxed apital gains on shares into more he ends.
1 vily taxed dividStnce the new view assumes that retained profits are the mgrginal source of corporate finance, it implies that the corporation's marginal irhvestment will generate an additional c/apital gains liability for shareholders, b~ecause increased retentions will tend to #se the market value of outstanding shdres. If the combined corporate and per/sonal tax burden on retentions (i.e., the sbrn of the corporate income tax on r?entions and the personal tax on capital 4ains on shares) exceeds the shareholderIs personal tax 282 on interest income, the required rate of return on corporate investment will exceed the market interest rate.
On the other hand, the new view has the striking implication that taxes on distributed profits are neutral. While it is true that dividend taxes reduce the shareholder's income from additional investment, they also reduce his opportunity cost of allowing the firm to retain profits for further investment. Thus, if the total corporate and personal tax burden on a dollar of distributed profits is 50 cents, the shareholder only has to give up a net income of 50 cents for each dollar retained for investment by the corporation. This 50 percent reduction of the opportunity cost of investment fully compensates for the 50 percent dividend tax levied when the profits on the extra investment are ultimately paid out, leaving the shareholder's net return unaffected by the tax burden on distributions. Hence, taxes on dividends have no influence on the cost of corporate capital, but are merely capitalized in share prices in order to ensure that investment in shares is just as attractive as investment in interest-bearing assets, despite the double taxation of dividends. One may also say that equity is "trapped" within the corporation in the sense that the funds accumulated within the firm will inevitably have to bear the dividend tax, whether distributions are made now or later. For a constant dividend tax rate, an investment policy that maximizes the present value of distributions before dividend tax will therefore also maximize the present value of dividends after tax. Hence, the neutrality of the dividend tax.
The new view thus implies that measures to alleviate the double taxation of dividends will not stimulate corporate investment, leading only to a windfall gain to existing shareholders and a corresponding loss of government revenue.
According to the new view, policymakers should focus instead on the double taxation of retained earnings resulting from the coexistence of the corporate income tax and the personal tax on capital gains on shares. However, since the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains is typically rather low because the tax is deferred until the time of realization of the gain, the new view also suggests that the problem of double taxation is not very serious and that the cost of corporate capital is probably not very far above the market interest rate, even in countries like the United States where realized long-term capital gains on shares are included in the personal income tax base.'
Reconciling the Old and the New View: The "Nucleus" Theory of the Firm If revenue-generating dividend taxes are neutral, one might be tempted to conclude that policymakers should increase the tax burden on dividends rather than worry about measures to alleviate the existing double taxation. This conclusion would be too hasty, however, since the new view explained above applies only to mature firms earning sufficient profits to be able to meet their need for equity finance through retained earnings. Holders of the new view do not deny that newly established firms or rapidly growing firms that have to rely on new share issues will face a higher cost of capital when dividends are subject to double taxation. Since shareholders are not entitled to a tax deduction for their purchase of shares, their opportunity cost of investment will not be reduced by the dividend tax rate, as is the case when the firm finances investment by withholding dividends. The net return to investment will therefore be reduced by the full amount of the dividend tax, and the cost of capital will be correspondingly higher, when new equity is the marginal source of finance and marginal profits are paid out as dividends.
It would thus seem that the old view may be relevant for immature or rapidly growing firms even if the new view provides a correct description of mature firms. Yet, tt has been argued by Sinn (1991 b) that the cost of capital for an immature firm will be even higher than predicted by the old view. The old view suggests that a corporation that is about to be set up should immediately issue the amount of shares necessary to carry investment to the ooint where the marginal return just compensates for the extra tax on dividends relative to interest income. However, Sinn (1991 b) points out that if retentions are taxed more lightly than distributions, it may be optimal for a corporation in the start-up phase to issue a smaller amount of shares than this investment rule would suggest. The reason is that the tax system provides an incentive to postpone investment until the firm begins to make profits so that it can finance investment lout of tax-preferred retentions. If it only has a limited number of investment projects with above-normal rates of return, the new firm foregoes the possibility of financing these investments by "cheaper" capital (retentions) at a later date if it raises new equrty today in order to implement all prqjects at once. The loss of the opportunlity to use a cheaper mode of finance at a later stage represents an additional opportunity cost of current investment for the immature firm that must be added to the cost of capital.
According to Sinn (1991 b), a new corporation should therefore issue only a limited amount of new shares at the time of foundation---i.e., it should start only with a small "nucleus" of equityin order to carry out only the most profitable of its planned investment projects.
The remaining projects with relatively high returns should be ,financed exclusively out of retained e rnings subsequent growth ph ! in the se of the firm, and no dividends shoul be paid during this phase, since this w lightly taxed capital gai I uld transform s into heavily taxed dividends. The gr 1 ater the tax discrimination against dist ibutions relative to retentrons, the lowe should be the initial injection of equi 4 d , and the greater should be the volume f investment financed by retentions in' the subsequent growth phase. The gro wt h phase comes to an end when the ca' ital P stock has expanded to the point rhere additional investment no longer yi Ids abovenormal rates of return. 'h he corporation then enters the stage of maturity, where net investment become F zero and where profits are paid out as 4 ividends. In this phase, the "trapped-equity" argument applies, i.e., the dividend tax becomes neutral, and the cost ofI capital becomes equal to the value impli view. The point is, how I d by the new ver, that under very mild conditions the initial cost of capital is even higher t 4 an suggested by the old view at the time the firm is set up. Moreover, the cost f capital remains above the value redicted by the i new view during the dr ve to maturity. The reason is that the gradual fall in the marginal productivity of capital during e the growth phase will g, nerate a gradual capital loss to shareholders for which they must be compensated by an abovenormal rate of return on the corporation's real investment.
Notice the paradoxical implication of this dynamic theory of the c rporate firm: the double taxation of ividends will B drive up the cost of cap tal during the growth phase where the firm does not pay dividends and no di ii idend tax is collected, whereas the divi end tax will be neutral in the maturity dends are actually paid gins to yield revenue! While we have so far assumed true economic depreciation, depreciation for tax purposes is in fact often allowed to exceed the true rate of depreciation. By being able to move the deduction for depreciation forward in time, the firm essentially obtains an interest-free loan from the government. This interest-free "tax debt" reduces the firm's need to rely on other sources of finance and may have important implications for the cost of capital, as we shall see below.
Traditionally the economic literature on corporate income taxation has also tended to neglect the existence of legal constraints on the amount of dividends that the corporation may distribute.6 In practice, however, all OECD countries apply some such constraint with the purpose of protecting the equity base of the corporate sector. In the absence of "free" reserves accumulated in the past, the legal dividend constraints essentially imply that current dividends cannot exceed some measure of current after-tax corporate earnings. This is important because it constrains the firm's ability to take advantage of the tax-preferred status of debt finance by increasing its borrowing in order to increase its dividend payments. As a consequence of this limitation on borrowing, the cost of capital will be higher than it would be if firms could fully exploit the advantages of debt finance.
As Kanniainen and Sbdersten (1994a) have shown, the exact implications for the cost of capital will depend on the exact form of the dividend constraint, which in turn is related to the accounting conventions used in the country. The Anglo-Saxon countries plus a few other OECD countries adhere to the convention of separate reporting, which means that the profits shown in the public accounts drawn up for the shareholders need not coincide with the profits registered in the tax accounts. Roughly speaking, these "two-book" countries allow corporations to distribute the after-tax profits recorded in the public accounts minus the amount of taxes deferred through accelerated depreciation. It can be shown that this convention enables the firm to finance all of its marginal investment by a combination of regular debt and "tax debt" stemming from tax deferrals, if it borrows to the maximum extent allowed by the dividend constraint. Because the tax debt is interest free, the cost of capital will then fall below the market interest rate in the presence of accelerated depreciation, and a rise in the corporate income tax rate will reduce the required return by increasing the value of tax debt; a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the "taxation paradox." Still, one can demonstrate that the cost of capital will be higher than it would be if the legal dividend constraint did not force the firm to reduce its borrowing and to increase its retentions by an amount equal to its tax deferrals.
While separate reporting prevails in the Anglo-Saxon world, the majority of OECD countries practice uniform reporting, requiring that the profit shown in the public accounts must coincide with the profit recorded in the tax accounts. In these "one-book" countries, the dividend cannot exceed the amount of taxable profit after tax. This means that the corporation is forced to retain not only the amount of taxes deferred (i.e., the tax rate times the amount of accelerated depreciation); in fact it must retain the entire amount by which depreciation for tax purposes exceeds the true deprecia-tion of its assets. In this way, the firm is forced to rely more on retained earnings and less on tax-preferred debt finance, so uniform reporting implies a higher cost of capital than separate reporting.
From the corporation's cash flow constraint, it is possible to show that if dividends are not allowed to exceed aftertax taxable profits, the amount of borrowing can be no greater than the firm's gross investment minus the depreciation recorded in the tax accounts. Hence, when the dividend (borrowing) constraint is binding, depreciation for tax purposes will always correspond to gross investment minus borrowing, i.e., the depreciation taken in the tax accounts will equal the equity-financed part of new investment. This means that the firm's equity-financed investment is immediately written off in the tax accounts. The corporate income tax therefore becomes neutral, for while the tax does confiscate part of ,the cash inflow from new equity-financed investment, it also finances a corresponding part of the investment outlay through the immediate write-off. In shiort, the corporation tax will tend to work like a neutral cash flow tax under uniform reporting, at least if there are no nontax factors discouraging corporations from borrowing to the maximum extent allowed by the dividend constraint:.
However, this analysis does not imply that the cost of corporate capital is entirely unaffected by the parameters of the corporate tax system under uniform reporting. It can be shown that the possibility of accelerated depreciation will still reduce the cost of capital if the effective personal tax rate on capital gains is lower than the personal tax rate on interest income.. When the dividend constraint is binding, an increase in deductions for depreciation requires the firm to reduce its borrowing and increase its retentions by a corresponding amount.
As we have just explained, this switch from debt finance tow rd equity finance does not generate an I dditional corporate income tax burde , due to the extra deduction for deprecia ion. At the individual investor level, th substitution of retained earnings for d bt implies that personal taxes on inter st income are replaced by personal tax i s on capital gains on shares. If capital ga'ns are more lightly taxed, the total ax burden on investment therefore go s down, and hence the cost of capit I is reduced when the corporation akes advantage i of accelerated deprecia, ion.
Monitoring
Costs, Divi end Constraints, p and the Cost of Capit I: The "Nordic" View According to the abov analysis, a corporation wishing to mi imize its cost of capital will have a tax i I centive to exploit deductions for ac elerated depreciation to the maximum possible extent. Nevertheless, as Kanniainen and Sddersten (1994b) stimulate corporate investment. Since the corporate income tax rate is likewise neutral under uniform reporting, we arrive at the striking hypothesis that neither the rate nor the definition of the base of the corporation tax has any impact on the cost of corporate capital in the majority of OECD countries adhering to uniform reporting! What are the nontax benefits from debt finance responsible for this result? The explanation offered by Kanniainen and Sbdersten (1994b) starts from the observation that shareholders and corporate managers do not necessarily have identical interests.' In the presence of imperfect and asymmetric information, corporate managers may therefore need to be monitored to ensure that they stick to an efficient, value-maximizing behavior. Still, the individual shareholder will often have little incentive to incur the costs of monitoring, because the benefits of improved management efficiency will be shared with all other stockholders in the firm. Shareholders will therefore wish the corporation to turn regularly to the external capital market, since the suppliers of debt capital (e.g., banks) have an obvious interest in monitoring the firm to make sure it is run efficiently so that the risk of bankruptcy is minimized. The use of debt finance will thus help to reduce the shareholders' costs of monitoring corporate managers, and if the saving of monitoring costs is sufficiently large, the controlling shareholder may want the corporation to forego some available tax allowances in order to make room for increased corporate borrowing.8
A Modified Nordic View
However, as pointed out by Sorensen (1995) , if debt finance reduces shareholder monitoring costs by exposing managers to the scrutiny of professional agents in the capital market, there are reasons to believe that the use of new equity finance will likewise tend to reduce monitoring costs for the firm's owners. For instance, when the corporation issues new shares, its affairs will often be reviewed by an investment banker or by underwriters of stock, and such reviews may help to expose management inefficiencies.
If the saving of monitoring costs associated with new share issues is nonnegligible and the tax penalty on dividends relative to capital gains is not too large, it may be profitable for the firm to issue new shares while at the same time paying dividends to existing shareholders, as is sometimes observed in practice. Within such a regime, one can show that if certain restrictions on the parameters of the monitoring cost function are satisfied, a fall in the tax burden on distributed profits will stimulate the use of new share issues. This in turn will reduce the marginal monitoring costs associated with a rise in the corporation's capital stock, thereby encouraging its real investment, in accordance with the old view of dividend taxation (see Sorensen, 1994 Sorensen, , 1995 
details).
On the other hand, if the monitoring cost saving stemming from new share issues is small and/or the tax penalty on dividends is large, the theory suggests that mature corporations will not wish to resort to new share issues but will instead rely only on a combination of debt and retained earnings. In that case, we are back to the regime of corporate tax neutrality analyzed by Kanniainen and Sodersten (1994b) .
The recent theories stressing the importance of accounting conventions for the cost of corporate capital are summarized in Table 2 . As stated in the table, the presence of monitoring cost savings from debt finance does not eliminate the firm's incentive to take full advan- Kanniainen and Sodersten (1994a , b) 'and Ssrensen (1994 , 1995 . All results reported in the table are based on the assumption that marginal profits are paid out a s dividends.
tage of allowances for accelerated depreciation under separate reporting (see Slzlrensen, 1994, Appendix) . The reason is that this accounting regime does not clonstrain the use of debt finance to the same extent as the regime of uniform reporting.
It should be added that the monitoringciost theory sketched here is not the only possible explanation why corporations in "one-book" (uniforrn-reporting) countries may not wish to exploit all available depreciation allowances. As Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (1994) have pointed out, firms in one-book countries may also be reluctant to claim all potential tax benefits if reductions in taxable inclome may be misinterpreted by financial markets as signals of lower profitability. Indeed, these authors find empirical evidence that investment in one-book countries is less sensitive to tax-law changes than lnvestlment in "two-book" countries allowing separate reporting. This underscores the importance of analyzing a country's accounting regime when evaluating the incqntive effects of the cofrporation tax.
TAXATION OF CORPORATE-SOURCE INCOME IN THE OPEN ECONOMY
We have so far ignored {he complications arising from the o$enness of the economy. In the remain d er of the article we shall briefly consider how the corporate tax system affects ttJe incentive to undertake domestic corpprate investment Iwhen the econom)/ is open to international capital mobility.g
Taxes on Saving Versus
Taxes on
Investment
With capital mobility it becomes crucial to distinguish taxes on saving from taxes on investment.
In a closeld economy, this distinction is unimportant because any tax that tends to reduce ,the level of saving will also disc:ourage investment, and vice versa, due to the eqhilibrium condition that saving must equal investment. By contrast, in the open ~economy, domestic asset returns need not adjust to 288 equilibrate aggregate saving and investment, because any difference between the two magnitudes may be accommodated through capital exports or capital imports. Hence, taxes on the return to saving undertaken by domestic residents may primarily tend to discourage domestic saving and to stimulate capital imports without significantly affecting domestic investment, whereas taxes on the return to capital invested in the domestic economy may primarily induce a fall in domestic investment and a concomitant capital outflow without much change in the domestic savings level.
As emphasized by Boadway and Bruce (1992) , the personal tax on dividends and shareholder capital gains is a tax on saving, whereas the corporate income tax is more appropriately categorized as a tax on investment. In the OECD area, the personal income tax is based on the residence principle, implying that individual shareholders are liable to tax on their worldwide income, whether it originates from domestic or from foreign sources. Formally, most OECD countries also tax corporations registered in the country on a worldwide basis, offering a credit for taxes already paid to foreignsource countries. Yet, in practice, the corporate income tax comes closer to a tax based on the source principle, under which income is taxed only in the country where it is earned.
There are several factors tending to turn the formally residence-based corporation tax into a de facto source-based tax. For one thing, half of the OECD countries exempt dividend income from foreigncontrolled corporations from domestic corporate income tax, unless the dividend originates from a tax-haven country.
Second, even when income from foreign subsidiaries is liable to domestic corporate income tax, as in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the domestic tax is usually deferred until the time the income is repatriated in the form of dividends. As Hartman (1985) pointed out, this practice of deferral means that the "trapped equity" argument of the "new" view applies to income from foreign direct investment: if a foreign subsidiary finances investment by retaining profits abroad, the parent company avoids the dividend tax on repatriations, and this reduction of the opportunity cost of foreign investment compensates for the domestic dividend tax imposed when the profits are ultimately repatriated. Hence, for investment by mature foreign subsidiaries using retentions as the marginal source of finance, only the foreign corporate income tax affects the cost of capital, as would be the case under a pure sourcebased tax system. Third, since the home countries of parent companies offer a foreign tax credit only up to the limit given by the amount of domestic tax on the foreign income, foreign direct investment will be subject only to foreign corporation tax whenever the effective foreign tax rate exceeds the effective domestic corporate tax rate.
Fourth, when it comes to foreign portfolio investment, the domestic residence country typically does not grant any tax credits for the foreign corporation tax on the corporate profits underlying the shareholder's portfolio income.
Thus, to a first approximation, it does not seem misleading to assume that the corporate income tax works essentially like a source-based capital income tax. To the extent that a rise in the corporate income tax rate would tend to reduce corporate investment in a closed economy, it will therefore have an even stronger negative impact on domestic in-vestment in the open economy where the higher domestic tax burden may be avoided by channeling corporate investlment abroad.
Will the Corporation Tax Vanish in the Open Economy?
This observation has led some writers to suggest that source-based capital income taxes like the corporation tax may tend to vanish in the long run as international (capital mobility bec:omes near-perfect." The idea is that if the government of a small open ec:onomy cannot tax foreignsource corporate inlcome, it cannot imIpose any tax burden on the domestic owners of corporate capital when capital Imobility is perfect. If the government llevies a tax on corporate income from domestic investment, corporate capital will tend to flee the country since the after-tax return offered on foreign investment is unchanged. In principle, this Iprocess will continue until the pretax Irate of return on domestic corporate investment has risen by the full amount of the domestic tax. The tax burden is thus .fully shifted onto the owners of internationally immobile factors such as labor and land, because the capital flight reduces the demand for these factors. IHowever, since it is more efficient to imIpose explicit taxes Ion the immobile factors rather than taxing them indirectly 'via a corporate income tax that distorts IInvestment decisions, a rational governlment seeking to minimize the deadweight loss from taxation should rely solely on direct taxes on immobile factors and should impose no corporate income tax (or any other source-based (capital income tax) at all! If governments actually followed this Iprescription, the traditional worries about the double taxation of corporatesource income might soon become obsolete. However, there are several reasons why the corporate income tax will hardly vanish in the long run, despite the growing internation+Y mobility of capital. First of all, it m y be politically t infeasible to impose hig explicit taxes on immobile factors, and the government may therefore have to tax these factors indirectly through the sourcebased corporate incomei tax, even though this Involves a h~igher efficiency cost. Second, because df local factors, multinational corporatiohs will sometimes be able to earn above-normal returns by investing in a particular country. The c:orporation tax enalbles the domestic government to capture some of these "'location-specific rents" without deterring investment.. Third, t/he international mobility of direct business investment is unlikely to become quite perfect. A reallocation of production activities and physical capital across c untries usually involves considerable ad'ustment costs. 1 Consequently, it will oft n be unprofitable for multinationals to relocate their activities in response to ~(modest) tax differentials. Fourth, as long as some important capital-exporting countries like the United States continue to offer credits for taxes on foreign-$ource income, it would be inefficient for ~capital-importing countries not to imposes a source-based corporation tax in orders to shift revenue from the foreign to the~domestic Exchequer without deterring foreign investors."
The Effects of Domestic Double Tax Relief in the Open fcohomy Since the corporate income tax is likely to survive, it is still relevant to ask blow measures to alleviate th double taxation of corporate-source inc ,' me will affect domestic corporate invektment in the open economy?
Consider first the simplified case of a small open economy with a national stock market that is perfectly integrated in the international stock market. All shares in domestic corporations are thus traded in the world stock market, and given the smallness of the domestic economy, stock prices are determined by the arbitrage behavior of foreign investors. The international price of shares in domestic corporations determines the domestic cost of equity finance, i.e., the rate of return after corporation tax (but before personal tax) that a domestic corporation must be able to offer on its equity-financed investment, whether investment takes place at home or abroad.
Suppose now that the domestic government decides to integrate its corporate and personal income taxes, say, by offering a dividend tax credit to domestic residents holding shares in domestic corporations. Clearly, this makes domestic shares more attractive for domestic investors who therefore increase their demand for shares in domestic firms. However, if foreign investors do not receive the dividend tax credit, the increased demand from domestic investors will just induce foreigners to sell part of their domestic shares to domestic residents, without any noticeable effect on stock prices. Since the relative tax treatment of domestic and foreign shares is unchanged from the viewpoint of foreign investors, the price of domestic shares will also have to stay the same for the large foreign investor group to remain in portfolio equilibrium. As a consequence, the dividend tax credit will fail to reduce the cost of equity finance for domestic corporations, and will only serve to shift part of the shares in domestic firms from foreign to domestic owners without stimulating real domestic investment.
To obtain a fall in the domestic cost of corporate capital it would be necessary to extend the dividend tax credit to foreign shareholders, since this would make domestic shares relatively more attractive for international investors. Alternatively, the domestic government could decide to relieve double taxation at the corporate level, say, by allowing all dividends or an imputed return to equity to be deducted from the domestic corporate income tax base. The above analysis is of some relevance since most OECD countries with integrated corporate tax systems have preferred to alleviate double taxation at the shareholder level and have typically only granted dividend tax relief to domestic holders of domestic shares." Notice, however, that while tax relief to domestic shareholders may fail to stimulate domestic corporate investment, it does tend to eliminate the distortion in favor of investment in the noncorporate sector of the economy. Since a dividend tax credit reserved for domestic shareholders will increase a domestic investor's after-tax return on shares, it will also raise his required return on domestic noncorporate investment. Of course, the price to be paid for this intersectoral equalization of the cost of capital is a fall in investment in the noncorporate sector.
Double Tax Relief and the Role of Small Private Companies
When the assumptions made in the previous section are relaxed, there may be cases where double tax relief aimed at domestic shareholders will succeed in stimulating domestic corporate investment. For instance, the tax discrimination in favor of domestic shareholders may become so strong that all shares in domestic companies end up being held domestically. In that case, the "marginal" shareholder is no longer a foreign investor, and domestic share prices will then be bid up by policy measures that make shareholding more attractive for domestic investors.
Even if the prices of shares in large public corporations continue to be dominated by the arbitrage behavior of for-eign investors, a realistic analysis should allow for the existence of smaller private companies in which the shares are not traded internationally.
Such companies are often controlled by owner-managers who may not consider their shares to be perfect substitutes for shares in large public corporations. It is therefore conceivable that the required return on shares in private unquoted companies may be reduced through domestic double tax relief even if the prices of internationally traded shares remain unaffected. However, this outcome is not certain, as demonstrated by Sarrensen (1994, pp. 40--43 ) within a portfolio model in which investors hold internationally traded bonds, internationally traded shares In public corporations, and nontraded shares in private corporations. Even though domestic shareholder tax relief will shift demand from bonds toward shares in general, it may also induce a shift of asset demand from nontraded to traded shares. This will be the case if the initial pretax return on nontraded shares is very low relative to the initial pretax return on traded shares. In that case, the reduction of tax on shareholder income will cause a much greater increase in the after-tax return to traded shares compared to the increase in the net return on nontraded shares, causing a portfolio shift away from the latter asset type. A sufficient (but far from necessary) condition for dividend tax relief to stimulate the demand for nontraded shares is that the pretax return on these &ares is no lower than the pretax return om traded shares (see Sorensen, 1994) . In1 that case, one can be sure that domestic shareholder tax relief will reduce the cost of equity finance for domestic plrivate corporations.
Concluding Remarks
Though we have left out many important topics and contributions, our quick jolurney through the theory of corporate income taxation may ha+e left a rather flimsy picture. The differknt views of the corporation tax do indedd lead to rather different predictions regarding the influence of tax policy on the cost of corporate capital. However, a Ireview of the many competing hypotheses does at least serve to focus attedtion on the crucial factors that will de&mine the incentive effects of the coiporate tax system: What is the marginal source of finance preferred by car i orations? What (if any) are the importan nontax factors determining corporate filpancial policy and how is this policy mpdified by tax consideratnons? What is the identity and tax status of the margindl shareholder? In particular, is the marginal shareholder a foreign or a domestic fesident, and is he liable to personal tax nor not? What is the nature of the accouriting regime and how do accounting conventions constrain the corporation's qbility to pay dividends?
Furthermore, the extent of disagreement over the incidence of thq corporation tax should not be exaggerat h'
d. Few economists would claim that t e corporate tax system is Interally neutral, and the inventors of the various tax neutrality propositions reviewed in this article probably see these propositions o&y as useful antidotes to exaggerated claims that the corporation tax causes hl$ge distortions. There is broad agreement that the double taxation of dividends hampers the growth of young and expanding firms, even if there IS less agre4ment on the importance of dividend t+xes for mature corporations.
Finally, the kneed to distinguish between taxes on 'aving and taxes on investment when f ana yzing the impact of the different con-/ponents of the corporate tax system in the open economy is by now well estat)lished.
Future theoretical and etipirical research will hopefully help to resolve those issues that are still unsettled.
